The Problem of Selfhood: A Critical Dialogue between Buddhist Philosophy and Contemporary Consciousness Theory

Abstract

This study analyzes and compares the problem of selfhood across Western philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and contemporary theories of consciousness. It reviews John Locke?s account of personal identity based on the continuity of memory and consciousness, David Hume?s critical view that denies a permanent self and instead identifies only a stream of perceptions, and Derek Parfit?s proposal that diminishes the metaphysical significance of personal identity. The discussion then connects these Western perspectives with the Buddhist doctrine of anatt?, explained through the five aggregates (pa?cakkhandha), which understands the self as a product of attachment rather than an enduring entity, and its further development in Mah?y?na Buddhism through N?g?rjuna?s concepts of emptiness (??nyat?) and dependent origination (prat?tyasamutp?da). These views are compared with contemporary theories that interpret the self as the outcome of neural processes and cognitive self-models constructed by the brain. The analysis shows that both Buddhist philosophy and modern theories converge in rejecting the notion of a permanent self and in understanding selfhood as a process or constructed phenomenon, while differing in their aims and methodologies. Buddhist philosophy primarily seeks the alleviation of suffering through inner practice and insight, whereas contemporary theories focus on empirical explanation and scientific analysis. On this basis, the study proposes a synthetic framework in which the self is understood as a multi-level emergent process characterized by narrative continuity and identity flexibility, with significant implications for the study of consciousness and applications in mental health.